[Dnsmasq-discuss] DNSMasq and DNS reflection attacks

/dev/rob0 rob0 at gmx.co.uk
Thu Oct 24 23:03:40 BST 2013


On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 05:28:29PM +0100, Simon Kelley wrote:
> On 24/10/13 17:03, Brian Rak wrote:
> >We've recently undertaken a project to clean up our network, and 
> >lock down all the open DNS resolvers. As you may know, these are 
> >very frequently used for DDOS attacks: 
> >http://openresolverproject.org/ , 
> >http://www.team-cymru.org/Services/Resolvers/ .
> >
> >I haven't been able to find any sort of configuration option that 
> >would prevent DNSMasq from being abused like this, and I've had to 
> >resort to iptables rules instead. Is there a configuration option 
> >that that would disable responding to DNS queries from certain 
> >interfaces? The other option that seems handy would be one to only 
> >reply to DNS queries from hosts that have a configured DHCP lease.
> >
> >Are there any features of DNSMasq that would prevent it from being
> >abused to conduct attacks?
> 
> This is an important topic, and quite difficult to understand, so 
> I'm going to take this opportunity to try and put a definitive 
> statement on the record.

Good stuff here, as usual, but questions still exist.

Yes, I think of dnsmasq in its original mission mostly: as a DNS 
forwarder and provider of internal DNS for [DHCP usually] LAN hosts. 
That seems to be the gist of your response here: to keep dnsmasq safe 
from Internet attackers, don't expose dnsmasq to the Internet.

However, in the coming age of IPv6 and [we hope] the decline of NAT, 
users will be more likely to want to expose dnsmasq to the Internet 
as an authoritative nameserver. I can see the potential need for 
serving both ip6.arpa zones and a zone such as "dh6.example.com" (the 
--domain in dnsmasq terms.)

I have reviewed the "AUTHORITATIVE CONFIGURATION" section as well as 
all the --auth-* settings in the manual, and I still have two 
concerns:

1. Is there a way to designate interfaces which ONLY respond to 
queries for our authoritative names? (--auth-server looks like it 
might do this, but it does not quite say so.) If I'm acting as NS 
host for dh6.example.com and <whatever>.ip6.arpa, I need to respond 
to those queries to anyone, but I don't want to let them look up 
google.com nor lists.thekelleys.org.uk. For that matter, they 
shouldn't even be able to get any names from /etc/hosts UNLESS those 
names are in my zone.

2. Is there a way to limit the response rate on these queries on the 
external IP address[es]?

A third concern, which isn't quite relevant to this thread, but I 
might as well mention anyway:

3. what about DNSSEC signing, will dnsmasq ever be able to serve 
signed data?

I'm a big fan of dnsmasq, BTW; it has made the jobs of SMB/SOHO 
network administrators much easier. The features I mention would 
improve safety while exposed to the Internet, but I am not sure 
they're worth the added size and code complexity.

It could well be best that dnsmasq should stick to its original 
mission. Those who want advanced features could use it as a hidden 
master for BIND (or other nameservers.) That part can work safely, 
and the slave server could do inline signing.



PS to Simon, a note on your manual: you should stick to example names 
for zones, not "our.zone.com" or "secondary.myisp.com". Note that 
both zone.com and myisp.com exist (the former being owned by 
Microsoft.) I'd consider perhaps s/com/example/ for those. Reference: 
RFC 6761.

Also in three places you make reference to "ipv6.arpa", which in 
other placess is correctly called "ip6.arpa".

Another very minor nitpick: under --interface you mention "IP alias 
interfaces (eg "eth1:0")". Those aren't interfaces at all; only the 
brokenness of Linux ifconfig(8) displays them as such. Please 
consider changing "interfaces" there to "labels". Help stamp out 
ignorance ... and even Linux net-tools itself! :)


> First the simple stuff.
> 
> Dnsmasq has --interface --except-interface and --listen-address
> configuration options that disable response to DNS queries from
> certain interfaces. The first thing that has to be done is to use
> these. Mostly it's the only thing that needs to done.
> 
> 
> Now, the complicated stuff.
> 
> Under certain circumstances, --interface=<interface> degrades to 
> mean the same as --listen-address=<address on interface>. For 
> instance if eth0 has address 192.168.0.1 and dnsmasq is configured 
> with --interface=eth0, then dnsmasq will reply to any query which 
> is sent to 192.168.0.1, no matter what interface it actually 
> arrives at. The circumstance under which happens is when the 
> --bind-interfaces flag is used.
> 
> Now, in the above example, this isn't a problem, since a botnet 
> can't direct traffic to an RFC-1918 address. If, on the other hand, 
> the address of an internal interface (ie one configured to accept 
> DNS queries) is globally routable, then queries which arrive via 
> another interface (ie one linked to the internet) with the 
> destination address of the internal interface _will_ be replied to, 
> and a DNS reflection attack is possible.
> 
> This has mainly been seen in libvirt and OpenStack installations 
> which use dnsmasq, since sometimes they are provisioned with "real" 
> addresses. I'd expect to see problems in the future with IPv6, 
> since far more people will be using globally routable addresses 
> with IPv6.
> 
> The reason that this happens is that --bind-interfaces uses the 
> bare-minimum BSD sockets API only. Detecting which interface a 
> packet arrived on, rather than the address to which it was sent, 
> needs non-portable API, and is impossible on some platforms 
> (openBSD, for instance) --bind-interfaces is a "works everywhere" 
> least common denominator. It's also useful when you're running 
> multiple instances of dnsmasq on one host, which is why most
> people use it.
> 
> The fix is to use either the default listening mode, or if running
> multiple instances, the new --bind-dynamic mode. --bind-dynamic is
> only available on Linux, and --bind-interfaces is the only mode
> available on openBSD, so BSD users have rather more problems here.
> 
> Summary. There's a problem is you want to accept queries in an 
> internal interface with a globally routable address and use 
> --bind-interfaces. The fix is to remove --bind-interfaces and, if 
> necessary, replace it with --bind-dynamic. This fix is not 
> applicable on all platforms,
> 
> The Real Soon Now 2.67 release logs a very prominent warning if the
> dangerous combination is configured.
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