[Dnsmasq-discuss] DNSMasq and DNS reflection attacks

richardvoigt at gmail.com richardvoigt at gmail.com
Fri Oct 25 00:22:12 BST 2013


In lieu of state tracking, I believe you can configure dnsmasq to use a
different port when making requests of upstream servers, so replies don't
match the "inbound to port 53" rule.  Or just unconditionally allow
upstream servers only as you mentioned.


On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 5:41 PM, Brian Rak <brak at gameservers.com> wrote:

>  On 10/24/2013 4:40 PM, richardvoigt at gmail.com wrote:
>
> Sorry, I should mention only drop packets in state "NEW", you don't want
> to drop replies to your own queries.
>
>
> On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 3:39 PM, richardvoigt at gmail.com <
> richardvoigt at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Your case should be easy to stop with a firewall rule.  Just block all
>> packets matching the dns listen port (53 usually) in the INPUT chain, where
>> the source address is outside your block.
>>
>>  Optionally (this prevents reflection attacks against your own network
>> which you said is not required), configure your router to drop packets
>> arriving on its external interface where the source IP is within your
>> internal network.  This is called a reverse route check.
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 12:11 PM, Brian Rak <brak at gameservers.com> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On 10/24/2013 1:00 PM, Simon Kelley wrote:
>>>
>>>> On 24/10/13 17:46, Brian Rak wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 10/24/2013 12:28 PM, Simon Kelley wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On 24/10/13 17:03, Brian Rak wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> We've recently undertaken a project to clean up our network, and lock
>>>>>>> down all the open DNS resolvers. As you may know, these are very
>>>>>>> frequently used for DDOS attacks: http://openresolverproject.org/ ,
>>>>>>> http://www.team-cymru.org/Services/Resolvers/ .
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I haven't been able to find any sort of configuration option that
>>>>>>> would
>>>>>>> prevent DNSMasq from being abused like this, and I've had to resort
>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>> iptables rules instead. Is there a configuration option that that
>>>>>>> would
>>>>>>> disable responding to DNS queries from certain interfaces? The other
>>>>>>> option that seems handy would be one to only reply to DNS queries
>>>>>>> from
>>>>>>> hosts that have a configured DHCP lease.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Are there any features of DNSMasq that would prevent it from being
>>>>>>> abused to conduct attacks?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> This is an important topic, and quite difficult to understand, so I'm
>>>>>> going to take this opportunity to try and put a definitive statement
>>>>>> on the record.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> First the simple stuff.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Dnsmasq has --interface --except-interface and --listen-address
>>>>>> configuration options that disable response to DNS queries from
>>>>>> certain interfaces. The first thing that has to be done is to use
>>>>>> these. Mostly it's the only thing that needs to done.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Now, the complicated stuff.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Under certain circumstances, --interface=<interface> degrades to mean
>>>>>> the same as --listen-address=<address on interface>. For instance if
>>>>>> eth0 has address 192.168.0.1 and dnsmasq is configured with
>>>>>> --interface=eth0, then dnsmasq will reply to any query which is sent
>>>>>> to 192.168.0.1, no matter what interface it actually arrives at. The
>>>>>> circumstance under which happens is when the --bind-interfaces flag is
>>>>>> used.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Now, in the above example, this isn't a problem, since a botnet can't
>>>>>> direct traffic to an RFC-1918 address. If, on the other hand, the
>>>>>> address of an internal interface (ie one configured to accept DNS
>>>>>> queries) is globally routable, then queries which arrive via another
>>>>>> interface (ie one linked to the internet) with the destination address
>>>>>> of the internal interface _will_ be replied to, and a DNS reflection
>>>>>> attack is possible.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> This has mainly been seen in libvirt and OpenStack installations which
>>>>>> use dnsmasq, since sometimes they are provisioned with "real"
>>>>>> addresses. I'd expect to see problems in the future with IPv6, since
>>>>>> far more people will be using globally routable addresses with IPv6.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The reason that this happens is that --bind-interfaces uses the
>>>>>> bare-minimum BSD sockets API only. Detecting which interface a packet
>>>>>> arrived on, rather than the address to which it was sent, needs
>>>>>> non-portable API, and is impossible on some platforms (openBSD, for
>>>>>> instance) --bind-interfaces is a "works everywhere" least common
>>>>>> denominator. It's also useful when you're running multiple instances
>>>>>> of dnsmasq on one host, which is why most people use it.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The fix is to use either the default listening mode, or if running
>>>>>> multiple instances, the new --bind-dynamic mode. --bind-dynamic is
>>>>>> only available on Linux, and --bind-interfaces is the only mode
>>>>>> available on openBSD, so BSD users have rather more problems here.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Summary. There's a problem is you want to accept queries in an
>>>>>> internal interface with a globally routable address and use
>>>>>> --bind-interfaces. The fix is to remove --bind-interfaces and, if
>>>>>> necessary, replace it with --bind-dynamic. This fix is not applicable
>>>>>> on all platforms,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The Real Soon Now 2.67 release logs a very prominent warning if the
>>>>>> dangerous combination is configured.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Simon.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Thanks for the detailed explanation! It seems that for some of my
>>>>> servers I can resolve the issue by using --interface and
>>>>> --except-interface.
>>>>>
>>>>> I do however have some DNSMasq instances that are providing public,
>>>>> globally routable IP addresses via DHCP. In order to do this, DNSMasq
>>>>> must be listening on an interface with a public IP, so it ends up
>>>>> providing DNS on that IP as well. I'm not sure if this is a common use
>>>>> case or not. For this setup, would there be any other option aside from
>>>>> iptables rules?
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Yes, use --interface to enable that interface for DNS and DHCP, and
>>>> DON'T use --bind-interfaces. As long as you're not using bind interfaces,
>>>> DNS requests which arrive via other interfaces won't be answered, even if
>>>> they have destination addresses for the enabled interface.
>>>>
>>>> An example:
>>>>
>>>> You have a router with two interfaces, internal and external. Internal
>>>> is where you're doing DHCP and DNS: it's connected to an ethernet with a
>>>> load of hosts. Internal has a globally routable address (and so, presumably
>>>> do the hosts on the ethernet). External also has a globally routeable
>>>> address and is connected to internet. Attack packets therefore arrive on
>>>> external. Setting --interface=internal means that attack packets which
>>>> arrive via external will NOT be answered, ever. The exception to this if
>>>> they are addressed to the IP address of internal AND --bind-interfaces is
>>>> set.
>>>>
>>>> So, don't use --bind-interfaces. If you're on Linux, you can use
>>>> --bind-dynamic instead if you're running multiple dnsmasq instances.
>>>>
>>>> Cheers,
>>>>
>>>> Simon.
>>>>
>>>
>>>  Ah, but that's the problem.  The machines I'm referring to only have
>>> one interface.  So, I'm primarily running this on virtual machine hosts.
>>>  They have one connection to the internet, and no internal network.
>>>
>>> So, for example we have a virtual machine host running with eth0 being
>>> 198.51.100.10.  DNSMasq is configured to listen on eth0 and provide
>>> 198.51.100.11-198.51.100.15 for any virtual machines that start up (virtual
>>> machines are recognized by preconfigured static leases, all other DHCP
>>> requests are ignored).  The virtual machines are all bridged to the eth0
>>> interface, and have no other connectivity.
>>>
>>> I should also note that my primary concern is preventing my machines
>>> from being abused to attack other people's machines.   Cases where someone
>>> would abuse my DNS server to attack my own machines are not currently a
>>> concern (as they're significantly easier to block).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>       Yep, currently we just block all incoming DNS unless it's from
> the upstream resolvers or any of the configured DHCP ranges.  We try to
> avoid state tracking whenever possible, because it's really easy to fill up
> the state tables on big web servers.
>
> I was hoping there was a DNSMasq option that would address this issue,
> just as an added layer.  It's very easy for iptables rules to get removed
> or disabled, but it's less likely that someone would unknowingly remove a
> configuration option.
>
> A configuration option to only respond to DNS from hosts with a valid DHCP
> lease would help with my setup, but I'm not sure how common my
> configuration is.
>
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